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Abstract. This paper studies a competitive banking industry subject to common and idiosyncratic
shocks. The induced correlation across bank portfolio returns can be used by a regulator to improve
inferences about bank portfolio choices. We compare two types of closure rules: (1) an ‘absolute
closure rule’,which closes banks when their own individual asset/liability ratios fall below a given
threshold,and (2) a ‘relative closure rule’,which closes banks when their asset/liability ratios fall
below the industry average by a given amount.
Two main results emerge from the model. First,a relative closure rule implies forbearance
during ‘bad times’,deﬁned as adverse realizations of the common shock. This forbearance occurs
for incentive reasons,not because of irreversibilities or political economy considerations. Second,
a relative closure rule is less costly to taxpayers,and the cost savings increase with the relative
variance of the common shock.
To evaluate the model,we estimate a panel-logit regression using a sample of U.S. commercial
banks for the period 1992 through 1997. We ﬁnd strong evidence that U.S. bank closures are based
on relative performance. Individual and average asset/liability ratios are both signiﬁcant predictors
of bank closure,and their coeﬃcient estimates are consistent with the theory. We conclude that
relative performance is a valuable input to bank closure decisions,and that U.S. bank regulators
seem to be aware of this.
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CA 94105.1. Introduction
In the wake of recent ﬁnancial turmoil, proposals for improved bank regulation
are once again the topic of the day among economic policymakers. A critical
component of any package of bank regulatory policies concerns the timing of
bank closures, i.e., when exactly are regulators supposed to pull out the plug
and close down (or forcibly merge) a bank? Other policies, like auditing, capital
requirements, and deposit insurance are designed to keep banks out of trouble,
or at least to contain the risks of trouble. Unfortunately, shocks happen, and by
the principle of backward induction, how and under what circumstances banks
expect to get closed has important consequences for how they behave before they
get closed. An eﬃcient closure policy should account for these incentive eﬀects.
The goal of this paper, therefore, is to study the incentive eﬀects of bank
closure policy. In doing this, we abstract from all other aspects of bank regulation.
We do this not only for analytical convenience, but also because our goal is rather
modest. We do not attempt to formulate a set of incentive compatible policies
that implement some notion of an informationally-constrained Pareto optimum.
We merely want to compare the cost eﬀectiveness, in terms of expected taxpayer
liability, of alternative closure rules. We can do this without taking a stand
on exactly what banks do, or should be doing. Instead, we just consider two
general types of rules which are simple, transparent, and pragmatic. Both rules
are designed to elicit the same response (i.e., risk) by banks. Given this, we can
then ask the following question — For any desired level of bank risk, which closure
rule is less costly?1
1There are studies that explore the interaction between bank closure policy and other policyThere are two key inputs to our analysis. The ﬁrst is the assumption that
banks are subject to common and idiosyncratic shocks. This should not be a
controversial assumption. While banks do tend to specialize, both geographically
and in terms of the kinds of loans they make, there is undoubtedly correlation in
the risks they face. Interest rate ﬂuctuations provide one example. The second
key input is the assumption that regulators are unable to monitor perfectly bank
portfolio decisions. This too should be uncontroversial. After all, specialized
knowledge about borrowers is the raison d’etre of bank lending.
Since bank actions are unobserved, closure policy must be based on ex post
realized outcomes. This confronts the regulator with a signal extraction problem.
For incentive reasons, an eﬃcient policy should attempt to distinguish between
banks that are in trouble as a result of their own actions (i.e., moral hazard), and
banks that were simply unlucky. While a policy of “prompt corrective action" can
indeed discourage moral hazard and save the taxpayers money, it can also cause
banks to be unduly cautious in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. Alternatively,
from a dual perspective, separating moral hazard from bad luck can achieve the
same overall level of banking industry risk at lower (expected) cost to the taxpayer.
We show that the key to separating moral hazard from bad luck is to base
closure decisions on relative performance. With a large number of ex ante identical
banks, relative performance is a good indicator of relative ‘eﬀort’.2 We show
instruments. For example, Acharya and Dreyfus ([1],1989) study the potential complementari-
ties between deposit insurance pricing and bank closure policy. However, they assume symmetric
information and focus their analysis on dynamics and timing issues, while we focus on moral
hazard and incentives.
2The advantages of relative performance contracts were ﬁrst discussed in the labor literature.
See, e.g., Lazear and Rosen ([7],1981) or Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz ([14],1983). It should be noted
2that a rule which closes banks whenever their asset/liability ratios fall below
the cross-sectional average by a given amount is superior to one based solely
on each individual bank’s asset/liability ratio.3 An interesting implication of a
relative closure rule is that it leads to forbearance during “bad times”, deﬁned as
adverse realizations of the common shock. It is important to realize, however,
that this forbearance occurs solely for ex ante incentive reasons, not because of
irreversibilities or political economy considerations.4 In fact, if he could, our
regulator would like to renege ex post on the announced relative closure rule.
Having achieved his goal of getting banks to make the right portfolio decision,
the regulator would then like to close unlucky banks in order to keep them from
“gambling for resurrection”.
Although time inconsistency is a potential problem, we regard the commitment
issue as fundamentally an empirical one. Legal and institutional constraints (e.g.,
FDICIA), even when they contain generous opt outs, undoubtedly provide some
degree of commitment. The real question is how much. To the extent that reg-
ulators lack credibility, our empirical results should reveal this by indicating the
that while our model presumes ex ante identical banks, our empirical work attempts to control
for one potentially important source of heterogeneity, namely, size.
3One might wonder whether such a rule would be consistent with the dictates of FDICIA,
calling for ‘prompt corrective action’, and which contains no explicit reference to relative per-
formance. However, as discussed in more detail by Mailath and Mester ([10],1994), the FDICIA
also directs regulators to resolve troubled banks in the least costly way, and grants regulators a
large degree of discretion in deciding how to do this.
4See Demirguc-Kunt ([3],1991) and Fries, Mella-Barral, and Perraudin ( [4],1997) for analyses
of forbearance based on irreversibility and the resulting option value of waiting. See Kane
([6],1989) for a discussion of forbearance based on regulatory malfeasance.
3irrelevance of relative performance in closure decisions.5 Besides, it is well known
that two-period models, like the one in this paper, provide unduly pessimistic
predictions about time consistency problems, since they rule out intertemporal
considerations (e.g., reputation building) that can sometimes overcome the temp-
tation to renege.6
We should emphasize that we are not the ﬁrst to point out the potential
incentive beneﬁts of a relative closure rule. Nagarajan and Sealey (1995) also
make this point. Our value-added is to formulate the problem in a way that
leads to empirically testable predictions. We do this by explicitly modeling a
large number of banks subject to continuously distributed shocks, and by basing
our closure rule on the cross-sectional average asset/liability ratio, as opposed
to some notion of a ‘market return’. One way to think of the diﬀerence is that
our regulator is more concerned with accounting information, while the regulator
in Nagarajan and Sealey’s paper is more concerned with stock prices. Still, our
analysis should be regarded as an extension of their work.7
Finally, to evaluate the model, we estimate a panel-logit regression using a
sample of over 12,000 US commercial banks during the period 1992 through 1997.8
5Of course, the converse isn’t necessarily true. That is, ﬁnding relative performance matters
does not prove that regulators can commit, since relative performance might be important for
ex post political economy reasons. See, e.g., Kane ([6], 1989).
6See Mailath and Mester ([10], 1994) for a detailed analysis of the time consistency problem
in bank closure policy.
7Nagarajan and Sealey (1998) have recently extended this framework to a setting of adverse
selection as well as moral hazard, although in this more recent analysis they only focus on the
pricing of deposit insurance, not bank closure policy.
8See Thomson (1991) for an empirical analysis of the determinants of bank closure during
the 1980s. Interestingly, Thomson includes various measures of macroeconomic conditions, and
4We ﬁnd strong evidence that US bank closures are based on relative performance.
Both individual and average asset/liability ratios are signiﬁcant predictors of bank
closure, and their coeﬃcient estimates are consistent with the theory. Moreover,
the results are robust to the exclusion of small banks from the sample, as well
as to the inclusion of size as a controlling variable. Overall, we conclude that
relative performance is a valuable input to bank closure decisions, and that US
bank regulators seem to be aware of this.
2. A Simple Model of Bank Closure
2.1. Bank investment decision
We begin with a very simple model of bank closure. We assume that there are an
inﬁnite number of homogenous banks of measure zero. We model a representative
bank i, which decides the amount of ”eﬀort,” µi, to invest in enhancing the quality
of its asset portfolio.9 The cost of supplying an amount of eﬀort equal to µ is
assumed to satisfy the function V (µ), where Vµ > 0 and Vµµ > 0. For simplicity,
we assume that eﬀort costs are borne up front. This simpliﬁes the analysis by
making this cost independent of the probability of bankruptcy, but drives none of
our results.
There are two shocks; a common shock, θ, which aﬀects all banks, and an
idiosyncratic shock, εi, which falls on bank i alone. We assume that εi and θ are
distributed on the intervals [ε,ε] and [−∞,+∞] respectively.
ﬁnds that they are usually signiﬁcant predictors of bank failure. However, he does not really
discuss why these variables should be important.
9Similar frameworks for studying bank regulation can be found in Dewatripont and Tirole
[2, (1993)] and Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington [5, (1993)].
5The model has one period, although our analysis extends to the repeated case
if shocks are i.i.d. The timing of the model is as follows. First, the regulator
announces a closure rule. Next, the bank chooses its eﬀort level, µi. At the end of
the period, the shocks are realized and the value of bank assets minus liabilities
are determined, which we deﬁne as Ai. We assume that Ai satisﬁes
Ai = µi + θ + εi (2.1)
Finally, the regulator makes its closure decision consistent with its announced
rule.
To make the model interesting, we assume the regulator only observes the total
value of Ai, not the values of its components. We therefore limit the regulator to
closure rules conditional on Ai. Moreover, as we noted in the introduction, we
assume that the regulator can commit to a closure rule. Later we discuss the
implications of constraining the regulator to time-consistent rules.
Banks are assumed to have limited liability, having zero value under bankruptcy.
As in Marcus ([11],1984), we assume that if the bank is allowed to continue, it has
a charter value of C, which is taken as exogenous.10 This represents the expected
future proﬁts from continued banking operations.
Deﬁne ε∗ as the minimum realization of εi under which the regulator chooses to
allow the bank to continue in operation. Clearly, ε∗ will depend on the regulator’s
closure rule. Because regulators are constrained to follow closure rules based on
Ai, their observable indicator of bank ﬁnancial health, ε∗ will in practice be the
level of εi which yields the minimum value of Ai which does not result in closure.
10C is taken as exogenous for simplicity. Levonian ([8],1991) has demonstrated that the impact
of closure rules on bank behavior can be dependent on charter values.
6For now, we note that for all the closure rules we entertain below, ε∗ is a decreasing
function of both bank eﬀort µi and the common shock θ, since Ai is increasing in
both these arguments.
The representative bank’s investment decision is to choose µi to maximize




ε∗ (Ai + C)f (ε)dε

g(θ)dθ − V (µ) (2.2)
where f (·) is the density of ε and g(·) is the density of θ.









(µi + θ + ε
∗ + C)f (ε
∗)

g(θ)dθ = Vµ (2.3)
The two arguments on the left-hand side of equation 2.3 represent the marginal
beneﬁts of additional eﬀort. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the increased expected payoﬀ
in non-bankruptcy states, holding the probability of bankruptcy constant. The
second term reﬂects the value of the change in the probability of bankruptcy which
results from a marginal change in eﬀort.
2.2. Case 1: Regulatory standard based on absolute performance
We ﬁrst consider a closure rule based solely on absolute bank performance. Sup-
pose that a bank is closed if
Ai ≤ m (2.4)
where m =0is obviously a special case where banks are closed on insolvency.
Under this closure rule, ε∗ satisﬁes
ε









F (m − µi − θ)g(θ)dθ = Vµ − (m + C)f (ε
∗). (2.7)
Consider the special case m =0 , i.e. the closure rule is to close all banks on







i − θ) − E [F (−µ
p
i − θ)]} (2.8)
where µ
p
i is the privately optimal choice of eﬀort.
Now, suppose instead that one were trying to maximize the expected ”social”
stream of revenues from the bank plus bank charter value, net of eﬀort costs.
This stream would include expected regulatory liabilities under insolvency. The





(Ai + C)f (ε)dε

g(θ)dθ − V (µ) (2.9)





A comparison of 2.8 and 2.10 leads to our ﬁrst result
PROPOSITION 1: With a closure rule based on insolvency, the level of
privately chosen bank eﬀort is below that consistent with maximizing the total
”social revenue stream.”
The proof follows directly from the fact that Vµµ > 0, since f (−µ
p
i − θ) < 1
and E [F (−µ
p
i − θ)] > 0. This is the standard moral hazard result with limited
8liability: Since its losses are bounded from below, the private bank chooses a
lower level of eﬀort because it does not share in the gains to returns in bankruptcy
states. These are instead completely enjoyed by the regulator as a reduction in
liabilities.
Also, note that when the level of eﬀort is lower, the expected probability of
bankruptcy, and hence the regulator’s expected liability, will be higher.
2.3. Case 2: Bank is insured against common shocks by introducing
relative performance
We assume that there are a large number of banks, so that the law of large number
yields,
θ = A − µ (2.11)
where A and µ are the cross-sectional average levels of bank asset positions and
eﬀorts respectively. By equations 2.1 and 2.11, and since E (εi)=0
E (µi − µ)=Ai − A. (2.12)
By incorporating relative performance, then, the regulator can infer relative
eﬀort. We therefore posit a relative closure rule which satisﬁes
Ai − A ≤ n (2.13)
Under this closure rule
ε





9substituting these into the ﬁrst-order condition yields
 ε
n+µ−µi
f (ε)dε +[ µ + E (θ)+n + C]f (ε
∗)=Vµ. (2.16)
In equilibrium, since banks are homogenous, all banks make the same eﬀort
decision and the ﬁrst-order condition will satisfy
 ε
n
f (ε)dε +[ µi + E (θ)+n + C]f (ε
∗)=Vµ. (2.17)
2.4. Comparison of absolute and relative closure rules
2.4.1. Relative stringency of the two closure rules
In this sub-section, we compare the two closure rules. To allow for a common
comparison, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the relative closure rule which elicits the same level of
eﬀort as the absolute closure rule. We then compare the expected liability of the
regulatory institution under the two closure rules. We designate as preferable the
rule which delivers a given level of bank eﬀort with the lowest expected regulatory
liability.
In order to obtain analytic solutions for the regulator’s expected liability, we
must put more structure on the distribution of εi. Accordingly, without essential
loss of generality we assume from here on that εi is distributed uniformly on the
interval [ε,ε].
Deﬁne  µ as the level of eﬀort which satisﬁes equation 2.7, i.e. the equilibrium
level of eﬀort implied by the absolute closure rule in equation 2.4. When εi is
uniformly distributed, 2.7 can be simpliﬁed to yield the following relationship
between m and  µ
m =

V µ − Cf (ε∗)

(ε − ε) − [ε +  µ + E (θ)]
f (ε∗)(ε − ε) − 1
(2.18)
10Next, substituting into the solution above for the level of eﬀort under the
relative closure rule, equation 2.17, the value of n which results in banks choosing




V µ − [ µ + E (θ)+C]f (ε∗)

− ε
f (ε∗)(ε − ε) − 1
.
Combining, m − n satisﬁes
m − n =  µ + E (θ) (2.19)
To obtain some intuition about how these closure rules compare, deﬁne Am
and An as the minimum realizations of Ai necessary to avoid closure under the
absolute and relative closure rules. By 2.4 and 2.13, it is clear that
A
m = m (2.20)
and
A
n = n + A (2.21)
Substituting from equation 2.19, and 2.11, and using the fact that in equilib-
rium µ =  µ,
A
n − A
m = θ − E (θ). (2.22)
This leads to our second result:
PROPOSITION 2: For a given level of bank eﬀort, closure takes place at
higher (lower)levels of Ai under the relative closure rule than under the absolute
closure rule when θ exceeds (falls short of)its expected value.
11Intuitively, the proposition states that the relative closure rule will be more
stringent in good times, i.e. when the common shock θ is above its mean, and
more lenient in bad times.
Note that the implied ”forbearance” has nothing to do with the opportunity
cost of irreversibly shutting down banks, or with regulatory malfeasance. Rather,
forbearance is advantageous here solely for ex-ante incentive reasons. Basing
closure on relative performance allows the regulator to more accurately separate
banks choosing low eﬀort levels from unlucky banks. If a bank knows its eﬀort
level is likely to be detected and incorporated in the regulator’s closure decision,
it will choose a higher level of eﬀort.
2.4.2. Comparing regulator liability
Finally, we turn to the relative liability of the bank regulator. Deﬁne Lm as the
expected liability of the regulatory institution under the absolute closure policy






Ai ( µ,θ,εi)f (εi)dεig(θ)dθ (2.23)
Substituting for ε∗, and using the relationship between m and n and the fact






Ai ( µ,θ,εi)f (εi)dεig(θ)dθ (2.24)
Deﬁne Ln as the expected liability of the regulatory institution under the
absolute closure policy which elicits the same level of eﬀort ( µ). Substituting for
11Note that we do not consider the loss of bank charter value as part of the closure cost. This
seems to be the natural speciﬁcation, but the inclusion of charter loss would not change the
results systematically with either closure rule anyway.






Ai ( µ,θ,εi)f (εi)dεig(θ)dθ (2.25)
By 2.24 and 2.25





Ai ( µ,θ,εi)f (εi)dεig(θ)dθ (2.26)
Assuming that εi is distributed uniformly, this simpliﬁes to








This leads to our third result
PROPOSITION 3: For closure rules which elicit the same level of bank
eﬀort, the relative closure rule has a smaller expected liability to the bank regulator
than the absolute closure rule. Moreover, the cost advantage of the relative closure
rule is increasing in the variance of the common shock and decreasing in the
variance of the idiosyncratic shock.
2.4.3. Lack of Regulatory Commitment
Our analysis above assumed that the regulator could commit to a pre-announced
rule. However, it is easy to see that such a rule is not likely to be time-consistent.
For example, suppose that the regulator were only interested in minimizing its
expected liability. It is obvious that the regulator would always choose to close
the bank when it could, since a closed bank has a zero expected future liability
while the expected liability towards an open bank is always positive.
Our analysis therefore only demonstrates the dominance of relative closure
rules over the set of rules available to the regulator under the assumption that
13the regulator can credibly commit to a closure policy. When the regulator lacks
commitment, it will choose prompt closure. The hypothesis that the regulator
incorporates relative performance in its closure decision, which test in the following
section, is therefore a joint hypothesis that the regulator enjoys the ability to
commit to a pre-announced rule as well as the hypothesis that the regulator
minimizes the cost of soliciting a given eﬀort level.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Estimation method
In this section, we investigate whether relative performance matters for bank
closure decisions in the United States. Based on our theoretical model above, we
formulate a binary choice model in which the regulator chooses at each point in
time either failure or continuation of operations.
The deﬁnitions and sources for all variables used in this study are listed in
Table 1. We represent the regulator’s binary choice as a random variable F which
takes the value one if the regulator chooses failure and the value zero if the bank
is allowed to continue. Failure is deﬁned as the end of a bank’s existence whose
resolutions is arranged by the FDIC or other regulatory agency.
Ait represents the book value of the asset to liability ratio of bank i in period
t. The use of book values is consistent with the maintained hypothesis that the
bank regulator has imperfect information about individual banks’ ﬁnancial health.
Bank equity values also will partially reﬂect the regulatory environment in which
the bank operates, and hence would induce simultaneity. Finally, asset book
values are the material that regulator’s use in their closure decisions in practice.
14The average ﬁnancial position of banks in period t is represented by At the cross-
sectional mean value of the book asset/liability ratios of banks in period t.12
Finally, we also introduce a variable to measure relative bank size. SIZEit is
proxied by the book value of bank i in period t. The inclusion of this variable
is not suggested by the theory above, but we include it as a nuisance parameter
to investigate whether ”too big to fail” regulatory policies are inﬂuencing our
results. It is widely believed that regulators might be more hesitant to close large
banks in poor ﬁnancial conditions because of the potential for adverse systemic
implementations of large bank closures.
The following binary model then nests both the absolute and relative closure
rules discussed above
Pr(F =1 ) it = γt + β1Ait + β2At + SIZE + eit (3.1)
where γt represents a time dummy for period t and eit represents an i.i.d.
disturbance term.
3.2. Data
The data set used in this study consists of a panel of 12,303 US commercial banks
from 1992 through 1997. Starting with the FDICIA reforms of 1992, a relatively
homogenous regulatory environment has existed over the course of this period.13
12We also ran the speciﬁcations with the cross-sectional medians. These speciﬁcations yielded
similar results and are available from the authors upon request.
13While FDICIA was only formally passed by the United States Congress in December of
1992, it is clear that these reforms were already being incorporated in the closure decisions of
bank regulators throughout the year. Indeed, the 1991 data also seems to reﬂect the stricter
regulatory activity called for under FDICIA, although we left this year out of our reported
15All data was acquired for individual banks from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago’s Bank Condition and Income Database.
Because banks both fail and come into existence over the course of our sample,
the panel is not balanced. However, this should not lead to biases in the data
because the missing variables due to entry or random exit (as in the case of an
unassisted merger) are likely to be uncorrelated with the error term in our model.
In the case where observations are missing because of bank failure, the reason
for the missing data is precisely what we are attempting to identify in our model
speciﬁcation.
Summary statistics for the data are shown in Table 2. Our data set includes
113 bank failures over the 1992-1997 period. Because the number of failures in
our sample is very small relative to the number of non-failures, we use a LOGIT
speciﬁcation in all our analysis. The LOGIT speciﬁcation is insensitive to uneven
sampling frequency problems [Maddala ( [9], 1983)].
Two patterns stand out in the data. First, the average asset-to-liability ratio
of the banking sector increases over the sample, implying an increase in the over-
all health of the banking system. Unsurprisingly, the number of bank failures
diminishes over the panel, reﬂecting this increase in the ﬁnancial system’s overall
health. 1992 is a particularly active year for bank failures, primarily reﬂecting
closures associated with the new tighter regulatory policies under FDICIA. How-
ever, even excluding 1992 it is clear that the number of bank failures diminishes
over the sample. To rule out time-speciﬁc eﬀects in the data stemming from these
trends, we include time dummies, γt, in our speciﬁcations.14
sample to limit ourselves to the post-FDICIA period.
14Because there are no failures in 1997, we are forced to drop two of the time dummies, one
163.3. Empirical Results
The results for LOGIT estimation of the whole banking sample are listed in Table
3. The ﬁrst and second columns report the results for the absolute and relative
closure rules respectively. Absolute bank performance, Ait, enters signiﬁcantly
with a predicted negative sign in both speciﬁcations. However, the coeﬃcient
estimate on absolute bank performance is sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion
of a relative performance measure. In the speciﬁcation including relative perfor-
mance, its value almost doubles.
The mean industry performance measure included in the second column, At
is also highly signiﬁcant. Moreover, its value is of opposite sign and of the same
order of magnitude as the coeﬃcient estimate on Ait. The formal theory above
predicts that these coeﬃcients would be of equal and opposite sign, but we do not
ﬁnd that to be the case. Both likelihood ratio and Wald tests of this restriction
were strongly rejected. Nevertheless, the similarity in the magnitudes of these
coeﬃcients is supportive of the model above.
All of the regression diagnostics strongly favor the relative closure rule spec-
iﬁcation. Adding At to the speciﬁcation reduces the Akaike Information Crite-
ria statistic from 1,253.8 to 762.2. Similarly, the second speciﬁcation lowers the
Schwartz criterion from 1299.1 to 816.6 and the -2 log-likelihood from 1243.8 to
750.2.
of which must be 1997, to allow for estimation. We include dummies for 1992 through 1995 in
the speciﬁcations which yielded the results reported in Tables 3 and 4. Our results were not
sensitive to which time dummies were included. Estimates of the coeﬃcients on these time
dummies, as well as those for speciﬁcations including alternative time dummies, are available
from the authors upon request.
17The relative rule speciﬁcation also does a much better job of predicting bank
failures. Under the rule that a bank failure is predicted for probability values
greater than or equal to 50 percent, the absolute speciﬁcation fails to predict any
of the bank failures in the sample. In contrast, the relative rule predicts 27 of
the 113 bank failures correctly, achieving a respectable level of Type-I error for
such a parsimonious speciﬁcation.15
The third and fourth columns add bank SIZE to the speciﬁcation in the form
of total book value of assets. A ”too big to fail” theory of bank closure policy
would suggest a negative coeﬃcient on this variable, as regulators would resist
closing large banks due to systemic concerns. While size does have the predicted
negative coeﬃcient estimate, it fails to achieve statistical signiﬁcance in either
speciﬁcation, a disappointing performance in such a large sample. As such, our
analysis provides little support for the contention that regulators pursued a too
big to fail policy over the sample period.
More importantly, the consideration of bank size fails to have much aﬀect
on the closure rule estimates we obtained in the earlier speciﬁcations. Ait and At
enter in the presence of a bank size variable with quite similar coeﬃcient estimates
as they obtained in absence of a proxy for bank size. Again, the diagnostic and
classiﬁcation statistics strongly support the relative closure rule speciﬁcation over
a simple absolute closure rule.
To investigate whether our results were driven by the large number of small
151992 through 1995 time dummy estimates are available upon request. Time dummies
were positive and signiﬁcant when At was excluded from speciﬁcation. With At included,
time dummies from 1992 through 1994 were still positive and signiﬁcant, although coeﬃcient
estimates were signiﬁcantly lower. 1995 time dummy was insigniﬁcant.
18banks in our sample, we re-ran the speciﬁcation excluding banks which had less
than $50 million in book value of total assets during the sample period. This
truncation reduced the number of both banking entities and bank failures in our
speciﬁcation roughly in half, from 12,303 to 6,052 and from 113 to 66 respectively.
The results for this truncated sample are reported in Table 4.
These results are quite similar to those in the previous sample. The coeﬃ-
cient estimates are all highly signiﬁcant and of the predicted signs. At enters
signiﬁcantly positive with a coeﬃcient of opposite sign and a similar magnitude
as the absolute performance measure, Ait.16 Moreover, the diagnostic statistics
strongly suggest a role for relative performance in regulatory closure decisions, as
speciﬁcations including relative measures continue to outperform those excluding
relative performance. The inclusion of the relative performance measure strongly
enhances sample ﬁt and reduces Type-I error.17
Finally, we again ﬁnd little evidence that bank size is a useful predictor of bank
closure. Bank size fails to enter signiﬁcantly, and both speciﬁcations appear to
be insensitive to its inclusion.
Our empirical results give a strong indication that US regulators considered
relative performance in their closure decisions during the post-FDICIA period.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the desirable policy in the theoretical model above.
Moreover, the results are robust to the inclusion of a proxy for bank size as well
as the exclusion of small banks from the sample.
16However, the two variables again fail to enter with equal and opposite coeﬃcients estimates,
which would satisfy a strong restriction implied by the formal model.
17Time dummies performed similarly to the entire sample and are available upon request from
the authors.
194. Conclusion
This paper has examined the role of relative performance in bank closure decisions.
We showed that when banks are subject to common shocks, a closure rule that
incorporates relative performance will be less costly than one based solely on
absolute performance. Our empirical results provide robust evidence that relative
performance has indeed been considered in bank closure decisions in the United
States during the post FDICIA period.
As we note in the paper, neither the relative performance rule nor the absolute
performance rules we consider above will be time consistent in a static one-shot
game. Instead, a regulator whose loss function solely involves minimizing ex-
pected regulatory will always choose prompt closure when regulatory rules allow
such behavior. In light of our empirical results, which suggest that relative perfor-
mance is incorporated in closure decisions, the source of commitment capacity of
the regulatory agency poses interesting questions beyond the scope of this paper.
An interesting extension of the analysis in this paper would be to endogenize the
commitment power of the regulator as a function of the closure strategy followed.
One might conjecture that this would strengthen the superiority of a relative clo-
sure rule, because the regulator could more easily commit to a less costly closure
strategy, which a relative closure rule would be.
20Table 1: Variable Deﬁnitions and Sources
FAIL - Binary variable which takes value 1 when a bank fails and value 0
w h e nab a n ki sa l l o w e dt oc o n t i n u e .
Failure occurs when a entity ceases to exist and its resolution was
arranged by the FDIC, RTC,
NCUA, State or other regulatory agency.
Source: FRB Chicago Bank Condition and Income Database
Ait - Book value of total assets divided by book value of total liabilities.
Total assets exclude loan loss reserves. Total liabilities
exclude subordinated debt.
Source: FRB Chicago Bank Condition and Income Database
At -A v e r a g e v a l u e o f Ait for all entities in sample in a given year.
Source: FRB Chicago Bank Condition and Income Database
SIZE - Book value of total assets excluding loan loss reserves
Source: FRB Chicago Bank Condition and Income Database
21Table 2: Summary Statistics1
Number of Average value of Ait for
Year At Bank Failures Failed Banks
1992 1.1036576 70 1.0239674
1993 1.1094140 26 1.0187820
1994 1.1102285 9 1.0396652
1995 1.1199680 4 1.0076993
1996 1.1235926 4 1.0139213
1997 1.1310269 0
1Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Bank Condition and Income
Database.
22Table 3: Logit Analysis Results: Entire Sample 1992-19971
Dependent Variable: FAIL
Variables Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Closure Closure Closure Closure
Rule Rule Rule Rule
(SIZE added) (SIZE added)
Ai −43.4310∗∗ −92.3343∗∗ −43.5164∗∗ −92.0875∗∗
(3.0450) (4.1180) (3.0287) (4.1055)
A 81.1730∗∗ 81.0328∗∗
(3.8871) (3.8785)
SIZE −2.21E − 7 −3.17E − 7
(1.891E − 7) (2.55E − 7)
Diagnostic
AIC 1253.800 762.224 1252.579 760.957
Schwartz 1299.096 816.580 1306.935 824.373
-2 Log L 1243.800 750.224 1240.579 746.957
#Obs 63534 63534 63534 63534
Classiﬁcation
Type I error 107/113 = 0.95 86/113 = 0.76 107/113 = 0.95 85/113 = 0.75
Type II error 0.00 0.0005 0.00 0.0005
Total Correct 99.8% 99.8% 99.8% 99.8%
1See Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions and sources. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ indicates Wald Chi-square statistic signiﬁcant at 5% and
1% levels, respectively. Time dummies for years 1992 through 1995 were included
in speciﬁcation. Dummy coeﬃcient estimates are available upon request from
authors.
23Table 4: Logit analysis: Small banks excluded 1992-19971
Dependent Variable: FAIL
Variables Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Closure Closure Closure Closure
Rule Rule Rule Rule
(SIZE added) (SIZE added)
Ai −42.9745∗∗ −86.7543∗∗ −43.2636∗∗ −86.5658∗∗
(4.2799) (5.0782) (4.2602) (5.0533)
Ai 76.7253∗∗ 76.7334∗∗
(4.8526) (4.8360)
SIZE −2.76E − 7 −4.42E − 7
(2.169E − 7) (2.924E − 7)
Diagnostics
AIC 728.302 490.896 726.295 487.912
Schwartz 770.045 540.987 776.386 546.353
-2 Log L 718.302 478.896 714.295 473.912
#Obs 31213 31213 31213 31213
Classiﬁcation
T y p eIe r r o r 61/66 = 0.92 54/66 = 0.82 61/66 = 0.92 53/66 = 0.80
Type II error 0.00 0.0007 0.00 0.0006
Total Correct 99.8% 99.8% 99.8% 99.8%
1Excludes banks with total assets below $50 million at any time during sample
period. ∗ and ∗∗ indicates Wald Chi-square statistic signiﬁcant at 5% and 1%
levels, respectively. Time dummies for years 1992 through 1995 were included
in speciﬁcation. Dummy coeﬃcient estimates are available upon request from
authors.
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